of members to one another or to a worthy project, an idea for an economic venture, or a collective activity. They emerge.
Inclusion and exclusion are central to the process of selforganized group formation. Some aspiring members end up in a group; others do not. Whether it is failing to make the team, being excluded from social cliques, or simply finding oneself standing around alone at a conference while others converse in animated groups, most people have had the experience of being left out. They have also had the experience of excluding others.
From the schoolyard to the economic arena, people who are left out of some groups can join others if the social structure is dynamic and groups continue to form and accept new members. This circulation of members among groups contributes to the flow of information and other resources throughout the community. If groups are more "closed" (Ziller, 1965) and membership less flexible, the costs for people who are left out or who leave a group may be an extended period of isolation. In the schoolyard, they are social isolates. At the societal level, they may be the homeless or the longterm unemployed.
When exclusion is seen as a problem, interventions can reduce the costs of exclusion for isolates or polish their credentials as aspiring group members so that exclusion will ideally be temporary. This paper examines how the strategy of compensating isolates (the people left out) affects the unfolding process of selforganized group formation.
In a laboratory setting, 30 sets of participants formed groups repeatedly and had economic reasons to restrict membership in Crosson, Orbell, and Arrow (2003) . Analyses reported here are not reported in either of those works.
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A separate study based on the same data set is presented in the second author's dissertation and in
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these groups, which ranged from three to five members. In one condition, isolates received no benefits; in the other, they received a small welfare payment from the experimenters. We examine group formation during multiple trials to track the impact of the two social regimes on the emergence and stability of patterns such as full inclusion (no one left out), smaller groups with fluid membership (which makes exclusion a transient event), and smaller fixed membership groups with a stable subset of isolates. We also consider the relationship between membership dynamics and cooperative or exploitative behavior within groups.
In the next two sections, we outline our theoretical perspective on self-organized group formation and then describe the experimental paradigm we developed to model the process.
GROUP FORMATION AS A SELF-ORGANIZING PROCESS
Consistent with the tenets of club theory from economics (Buchanan, 1965; Cornes & Sandler, 1996) , our overall conception is that self-organized groups form out of a larger pool of potential members who not only are free to choose whether to form a group together but also are free to leave such groups to seek or form alternative groups. Self-organized groups regulate membership and group size by selective admission or rejection of prospective members. As people interact and groups form, the pool of people differentiates into a system of groups and individuals.
We presume that potential members are motivated to form or join groups by needs, desires, and expectations about what the group might provide. We propose that membership preferences and decisions are determined by rational consideration of costs and benefits, by more emotional, nonrational factors (such as the inherent attraction of familiarity), by social norms, and by mutual influence among potential or established group members. We further presume that the weighting of these factors varies across groups and across time. Below, we unpack this overall conception into its constituent parts, framed as answers to a set of five questions.
How do groups emerge?
Self-organized groups emerge as connections among people in a larger social network cohere into a new collective structure. At the most abstract level, we think of self-organized groups as structures that emerge from elements in mutual interaction-in other words, as systems (von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 45) . In an idealized "blank slate" initial condition, a set of completely unconnected people begins to interact and dyadic connections emerge. As links proliferate and dyads chain together, self-organized groups precipitate out like crystals from a chemical solution. The resulting configuration of groups will have a structure that is constrained by, but not fully determined by, the context. The structure is created by the activity of interacting system elements-in this case, the behavior of people who become (or fail to become) group members.
From this perspective, self-organized group formation involves at least three levels of dynamics (Arrow, McGrath, & Berdahl, 2000) . Local interactions among individuals (the system elements) result in the formation of groups (one level of structure), and at the next level of analysis, group formation results in a configuration of groups and individuals. At the most macro level, this configuration makes up the structure of society (McPherson & Rotolo, 1996) . The overall conception is inspired by complexity science, an interdisciplinary set of theories and methods for studying the emergence of ordered aggregate behavior from nonlinear interactions among multiple components (e.g., Cohen & Stewart, 1994; Eidelson, 1997; Stein, 1989) 
Why do people form groups?
People form or join self-organized groups to gain the benefits of membership. This assumption about the local level of individual action is embedded in the basic concept of voluntary affiliationpeople join groups because they want to, presumably because they expect the groups to be rewarding. Buchanan (1968) proposed that clubs form spontaneously to provide goods that are available only to members. By limiting membership, clubs can also prevent crowd-ing that would degrade group benefits. In dynamic terms, shared attraction to anticipated benefits draws people together, whereas crowding (too many people) weakens the attraction by diluting benefits and can inspire a group to repel prospective members once it reaches or exceeds optimal size.
The economic theory of clubs emphasizes tangible goods and services as benefits. A broader inventory of motives for forming groups (Arrow, Bennett, Crosson, & Orbell, 1999 ) adds psychological needs for belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) , for control, for affection (Schutz, 1958) , and for achievement (McClelland, 1985) . The relative importance of different group benefits will vary across individuals and should lead to different levels of tolerance for crowding.
How do people choose among different (potential or actual) groups?
People will prefer groups with greater expected values (ratio of benefits to costs). The basic assumption of self-interested behavior follows the social exchange ideas embodied in the group socialization model (Moreland & Levine, 1982) , which describes the changing relationship among groups and members for small, autonomous, voluntary groups (Moreland & Levine, 1989, p. 143) . Because groups differ in the benefits they provide and because individuals differ in how they weight anticipated benefits and costs, groups will be differentially attractive to different people. High status groups, for example, should be especially attractive to people with a high need for power. Buchanan (1968) proposed that a variety of clubs would form that suit the different "tastes" of people for different types of benefits. Generalizing beyond economic benefits, clubs may focus on serving member needs for belonging and affection or on providing a collective activity such as sports (Arrow et al., 2000; Gruenfeld, McGrath, Beasley, & Kaarbo, 1993) .
People will prefer (potential or actual) groups that include others who are familiar and similar to self. People (and other animals) tend to prefer familiar stimuli, and this preference operates in many cases outside conscious awareness as a nonrational emo-tional response (Zajonc, 2001 ). This finding is consistent with evidence that people are more likely to form connections with people they encounter frequently (e.g., Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Newcomb, 1961) . Another factor that clearly affects interpersonal attraction is similarity to self (homophily). These emotional factors compose what Moreland (1987) called affective integration, one of several forces that contribute to the social integration of individuals into groups.
In dynamic terms, we can think of an array of actual or potential groups as falling along a gradient of attraction. The slope and the ordering of groups along this gradient will differ for different people based on both a rational assessment of the match of anticipated benefits to needs and more emotional factors such as the pull of familiarity and similarity to self.
How will groups choose among potential members?
Current group members will prefer potential members who (a) have a greater expected value to the group, (b) are familiar, and (c) are similar to themselves. The expected value of a potential member includes both the value of their expected contributions and the expected costs of adding them as members. The attraction of familiarity and similarity should lead group members to prefer familiar, similar people to unfamiliar, dissimilar others who otherwise have the same expected value to the group; it may also lead them to favor more familiar or more similar people over otherwise more "qualified" strangers. Hence, potential members will fall along a gradient of attraction, which will typically vary among existing group members.
The translation of member preferences into group decisions about membership will be guided by (a) social norms and (b) mutual influence among members. Social norms can specify how to translate conflicting member preferences into a collective decision (for example, by using majority rule) and can also embody more general principles of social interaction, such as those governing communal versus exchange relations. When group members are not sure what norm is appropriate, or when the application of a 528 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2003 norm does not fully specify what the collective choice should be, mutual influence among members can help the group reach a decision. Influence can change member preferences so that greater consensus is attained and can also alter members'willingness to endorse a particular decision, even if their preferences remain unchanged. Prospective members may also exert influence to gain entry in the group, and influence tactics may include evoking social norms that would favor their inclusion.
In dynamic terms, ordered, patterned interaction at the group level emerges as members coordinate their actions.
What will affect the membership stability of groups?
Less rewarding groups should have more turnover, provided other more attractive alternatives are available to members. This assumption is in line with the group socialization model in which member commitment (and thus the likelihood of turnover) is based on the degree to which members find the group rewarding (Moreland & Levine, 1982) . It adds the provision that other potentially more attractive options must be plausibly available, and thus is also in line with Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) proposal that the comparison with alternatives is critical in exit decisions. Attractive alternatives might be other existing groups, envisioned alternative groups that the departing member might form, or a nonmember option of "going it alone." Established groups will be more stable than newly formed groups. This assumption generalizes the "liability of newness" that has been documented for new organizations-which have a higher failure rate than older organizations (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983) -to newly formed small groups. We propose that members of new groups make only tentative commitments to one another (Arrow et al., 2000) . The actual benefits and costs of an emergent group are likely to diverge from expectations, and as they update their preferences, members may well discover that other alternatives have become more attractive. According to the group socialization model, the threshold of commitment of group to member and vice versa is quite low for entry into a group, not much higher than the exit level (Moreland & Levine, 1982) , whereas the level of commitment for full members of an established group is much higher. Any developments that decrease member commitment to the group or group commitment to the member are thus more likely to lead to membership change (exit or expulsion) in newer groups.
In dynamic system terms, flat gradients (more-or-less equally attractive choices) and fluctuations (which temporarily alter the relative attraction of different choices) both contribute to instability. As people settle into groups, connections with other group members strengthen, behavior becomes more predictable, and the group accrues the attraction of familiarity, which should bolster its relative appeal compared to possible alternatives. Fluctuations in member needs, in group benefits, or in the costs and benefits members impose-which may arise endogenously or due to exogenous disruptions-can dislodge members. As other groups stabilize, however, fewer plausible alternatives will be available for dissatisfied or rejected members.
MEMBERSHIP DYNAMICS IN EMERGING GROUPS
To summarize, we propose that self-organized groups emerge as potential members seek one another based on gradients of attraction to one another and to emerging groups. Member preferences, guided by both rational and nonrational factors, should evolve as people form and interact in emergent groups. Group membership should stabilize when the collective mutual attraction between groups and members strengthens relative to the attraction of alternative groups or members, a process that we predict will be enhanced by familiarity and cooperative interaction. Events that disrupt the relative appeal of existing groups for their members, including crowding and member exploitation of the group, should contribute to membership change, especially when gradients of attraction are relatively flat.
Although this account does not, of course, identify all factors that affect membership dynamics in self-organized groups, it does outline the assumptions on which the experimental game created to study the process is based. We describe the paradigm next.
SOCIAL POKER: OVERVIEW OF A GROUP FORMATION PARADIGM
According to Arrow and colleagues (Arrow & McGrath, 1995; Arrow et al., 2000) , a complex systems analysis of small group behavior requires attention to at least three levels: the local level of members interacting, the global level of the group as a unit, and the context in which the group is embedded. To observe the process of self-organized group formation, we needed an experimental paradigm in which all three levels-member, group, and context-were modeled. The social poker game (Arrow et al., 1999 ) fits this criterion.
The social poker laboratory paradigm captures in a social card game the following characteristics of self-organized group formation: (a) people seek out their own partners to form a group-they are not assigned to groups by outsiders, (b) groups emerge as a consequence of interaction among potential group members, (c) the composition of groups can change across successive rounds of the game, and (d) the context constrains possible outcomes without determining which groups will form. The game provides financial (earn money) and achievement (succeed at the game) reasons to form groups, along with any belonging and control motives activated by playing the game. Because multiple groups can form, participants have a choice among groups and groups can compete for members, providing a miniature ecology of groups and individuals. The game supplies potential group members with resources useful to the emergent groups and also allows members to impose varying costs on the groups they form.
In regular poker, individuals compete against one another to form the best poker hand. In social poker, each person receives playing cards, but no one has the right cards to form a hand alone. To form a social poker hand, participants must identify others with complementary cards, form a group with them, and pool their cards. The group then earns the posted value of that hand. The distribution of cards is arranged to ensure that a minimum of three players is needed to form a hand that earns money, but many different sets of people can potentially form groups. Hence the outcome Arrow, is not determined by the cards, but emerges from negotiations among players.
The social poker experiments described in more detail below used a pool of eight players. We chose eight because it makes it likely that some individuals would be left out of the groups that form. Three people are sufficient to form a hand; if two minimally sized groups form, two individuals will be left out, becoming isolates for that round. This allows us to study the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. When larger-than-minimum-size groups form, per-member earnings are smaller because group earnings are divided among more people. This creates a financial incentive to limit group membership. We provided full information about what cards each member held so that players could easily assess the potential contribution of each prospective group member. When the game is played by strangers, we can also track emergent familiarity based on shared membership in groups across successive group formation rounds.
METHOD PARTICIPANTS
A total of 239 students (164 women and 75 men) participated in the experiments to complete a course requirement. The average age of participants was 20.2, and their reported ethnicity was 74% Caucasian, 11% Asian, 2% Hispanic, 1% each Native American and African American, 4% mixed heritage, and 7% unidentified. The sign-up sheet directed people not to sign up for a session if they recognized the name of anyone who had already signed up.
PROCEDURE
Eight participants read an instruction sheet explaining the rules of social poker and took a quiz that tested their comprehension of the rules. The experimenter then reviewed the rules, checked people's answers on the quizzes, and explained in more detail any 532 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2003 points on which people were confused. The key rules were: (a) two social poker hands, four of a kind or three pairs, were both worth $10; (b) to make a hand, players had to form groups and pool their cards-trading cards was not allowed; (c) each group could turn in only one hand; (d) after groups discussed the division of earnings, members would make private claims-which could be an even dollar amount between $0 and $10-on the group earnings; and (e) if aggregate claims were $10 or less, every member received what he or she claimed, but if aggregate claims exceeded $10, each member would be penalized 50 cents for each dollar "overclaimed" by the group. For example, if one member claimed $10 and two claimed $3 (for a total group claim of $16), each would be fined $3 (6 × $0.50), so that one member would make $7 whereas the other two would make nothing (if penalties exceeded claims, players earned nothing).
The instructions encouraged players to discuss the division of money before they made claims, but stressed that their actual claims would be strictly private. Players understood that they would find out what they had earned at the end of each group formation round, but would not be told what others in their group had claimed.
Once the experimenter was satisfied that everyone understood the game, each participant donned a runner's bib with his or her player number and received three playing cards and an information sheet that showed who had what cards. After they had time to study the distribution and decide whom they would like to form a group with, players assembled in the middle of the room to seek out others and form groups. Players forming groups were instructed to move to one of three tables located in the corners of the room. They understood they would be completing multiple rounds but did not know how many. Four rounds were actually completed.
The card distribution for each round was arranged so that any set of 3 or more players could form a valid hand. After groups formed and the cards were collected, members were instructed to turn their chairs around so they were facing away from the rest of the group and they then completed a claim form and a questionnaire. Isolates received an alternate questionnaire. After claims were tallied, each group member was privately given a chit that indicated what he or she had earned for that round. People then returned to the middle of the room, received new cards, and repeated the group formation process. After four rounds were completed, participants went one by one to a debriefing area where they exchanged their chits for cash.
REASONING BEHIND THE RULES
The game rule that each group could form only one hand ensured that more than one group would form (without this rule, the optimal solution is for all eight players to pool cards and see how many hands they can make). The two different $10 hands and the configuration of cards made it possible for any three people to form a group without making this transparently obvious to participants. We wanted to ensure that people would attend to the resources each person had to contribute, without restricting which groups were possible. The claims process provided a potential reward for overclaiming that would tempt players while ensuring sufficient damage to group earnings that group members would take the problem of overclaiming seriously. Making claims private models a common problem in real-life groups of three or more in which it is often difficult to determine with certainty the source of misbehavior that degrades group resources.
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
Two conditions were run, the "standard" condition and the "welfare" condition. In the standard condition, the only way to earn money was to be included in a group. In the welfare condition, isolates received a $1 payment from the experimenter. The gradient of rewards for being included or excluded was thus less steep in the welfare condition. The instruction sheet and comprehension quiz reflected the difference in rules, and isolates received a chit for $1 at the end of each round. Otherwise, procedures were identical. Fifteen runs were completed for each condition. Because the design called for sets of eight participants for each run of social poker, peo-534 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2003 ple who signed up for the same experiment time were assigned as a set to the same condition. They were not randomly assigned one by one to the two experimental conditions. This departure from the ideal of random assignment made it especially important to consider ways in which participants in the two conditions might differ. Age demographics were virtually identical (20.4 vs. 20.1 years for welfare and standard condition respectively), although ethnic breakdown differed somewhat. Fewer participants identified themselves as Caucasian in the welfare (68%) compared to the standard (79.5%) condition, and more participants identified as Asian (15%) or mixed ethnicity (7%) in the welfare condition as compared to the standard condition (7% and 1% Asian and mixed ethnicity respectively). Women were more numerous in the welfare condition (72.5%) than in the standard (66%) condition.
MEASURES
Global configuration. Four configurations were possible, two that included everyone and two that did not. The fully inclusive configurations were two 4-person groups (4|4) or one 3-person and one 5-person group (3|5). The least inclusive configuration was two 3-person groups plus two isolates (3|3). A partially inclusive configuration was one 3-person and one 4-person group, plus one isolate (3|4). Configurations thus differed both in the number of people included and the distribution of redundant people across the two groups.
Membership continuity. At the group level, we classified each group that formed as new (a new membership composition not seen in previous rounds) or repeating (same composition as a previous round). At the 8-person population level, the index of continuity across rounds was based on a member-by-member matrix that indicated which of the 28 possible dyads were "active" (together in a group) for each round. If the exact composition of group members and isolates stayed the same, the matrices would be identical in adjacent rounds. If different groups formed, then different subsets Arrow, of dyads would be together. Because different global configurations "activated" different numbers of dyads (e.g., 6 dyads for a 3|3 configuration, 12 dyads for a 4|4 configuration), the index included an adjustment for number of dyads: M/([D 1 + D 2 ]/2), where M = number of matches for dyads active in both rounds, D 1 = number of dyads active at Time 1, and D 2 = number of dyads active at Time 2. Possible values ranged from 0 (neither group shared any dyads across rounds) to 1 (identical composition). With four rounds, there were three transitions for which continuity was calculated.
Continuity expected by chance. With the small pool of eight potential group members, some baseline amount of continuity in group membership would be expected by chance. To establish chance continuity, we conditioned on global configuration, enumerated all possible distributions of members given that configuration, and assessed dyadic continuity between all possible transitions. For repeating 4|4 patterns, for example, 35 arrangements of eight people in two groups of four is possible (eight people choose four for the first group)/2 (divided by 2 because order does not matter). Of the 35 possible arrangements, 1 of 35 is an exact repeat (12 of 12 dyads repeat, membership continuity = 1), 16 have repeating triads (6 of 12 dyads repeat, membership continuity = .5), and 18 have repeating dyads (4 of 12 dyads repeat, membership continuity = .333). Given these frequencies, the mean level of membership continuity expected by chance for repeating 4|4 configurations is .429, with a standard deviation of .128. The same calculations were completed for the 280 possible combinations for the repeating 3|3 configurations, yielding a chance level of membership continuity of .215, with a standard deviation of .152 (in contrast to the 4|4 case, repeating 3|3 configurations can have membership continuity scores of 0 or .16, whereas the lowest possible continuity for 4|4 configurations is .33). Repeating 3|4 and 3|5 configurations were too rare (2 of the former, 4 of the latter out of 87 transitions) to merit the labor-intensive work of enumerating all possible combinations. To correct the severe skew in the observed data, we recoded the claims into eight values based on distance from $10 (the amount earned), with claims of less than $10 receiving negative values of -2 or -1 and claims of more than $10 receiving positive values of from 1 to 5. All claims of $19 and more (which represents all values that were more than 2.5 standard deviations above the mean for raw values) were grouped in the "5" category. Groups were also classified dichotomously as either overclaiming or not.
THE LOGIC OF DYNAMIC SYSTEM ANALYSIS
The logic of analysis in studying the dynamics of selforganization necessarily differs from approaches that focus on measuring relations among variables at a single point in time (see Arrow et al., 2000 , chapters 9 & 10, for a discussion of methodological issues). Rather than measuring characteristics of an existing, presumed-to-be-stable structure, one is looking for the emergence of structure and stability over time. The goal is to describe temporal patterns, identify contextual parameters that constrain both the range of possible patterns and their stability, and consider how changes in contextual parameters might affect the behavior of system components.
The first step is to identify a relatively small number of global variables that together characterize the state of the system. In the current study, the emergent structures of interest were the membership composition of groups (group level) and the overall configuration of groups and isolates (population level). The next step is to track the evolution of these variables over time, to see whether the system settles over time into a single state (a fixed-point attractor), a cyclic pattern (a periodic attractor), or some more complicated pattern (quasiperiodic or chaotic attractor). Ideally, one examines multiple cases because the same system may have multiple attractors. This is done by plotting the trajectory of successive system Arrow, states in state space, the space of possible values that the variables can take (Abraham, Abraham, & Shaw, 1990) .
If there are multiple attractors, each will have a different basinthe region of state space from which the system will settle into that attractor. Basins vary in size, and attractors vary in strength (Kelso, 1995; Lewis, Lamey, & Douglas, 1999) . A system that has settled into a strong attractor will be harder to disrupt than one that has settled into a weaker attractor. The source of a disruption may be either external or endogenous to the system. In this study, we expected that overclaiming would serve as endogenous perturbation that could destabilize groups and by extension, the overall configuration of groups and isolates.
In complex systems, the layout of attractors is determined by internal dynamics among the components, which is in turn shaped by the setting of key contextual parameters. In the introduction, we identified three qualitatively different patterns of membership dynamics: full inclusion (no one left out), smaller groups with fluid membership (which makes exclusion a transient event), and smaller fixed membership groups with a stable subset of isolates. From previous analyses (Crosson, Orbell, & Arrow, 2003) , we knew that the availability of a welfare payment was associated with smaller average group size. Thus, the welfare payment appeared to alter a contextual parameter that shaped the behavior of individuals and hence, system dynamics. Average group size, however, provides no information about underlying membership stability or change. Dynamic system analysis can reveal details of the unfolding process at each level.
RESULTS
In the analyses reported below, we first investigate how the presence or absence of welfare for isolates (a feature of the embedding context) affects emerging structure at the level of the whole population. We then drop down to the group level and look at the relationship between membership stability, population structure, and overclaiming. We expected that familiarity would stabilize groups, 538 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2003 whereas crowding and overclaiming would promote membership change. We also examine the situation for individual isolates, the lowest level of analysis, to see whether the same people were repeatedly excluded from groups.
GLOBAL CONFIGURATION: EMERGENT STRUCTURE IN A SMALL COMMUNITY OF GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS
Our first analysis examined the global configuration of groups and isolates that emerged from a pool of individuals. Four configurations were possible: 3|3 (plus two isolates), 3|4 (one isolate), 4|4, and 3|5. One run of the experiment had only 7 participants; because only two configurations were possible for this set, it was excluded from this set of analyses. Table 1 shows the frequencies of each configuration across rounds for the standard and $1 welfare conditions. Increasing popularity of a configuration over time indicates a possible attractor, with populations starting in a range of different states changing to the attractor state. Of the 56 group formation rounds in the standard condition, 4|4 was the most common configuration, and it became more common across rounds. By the final round, the 14 populations had bifurcated into one of two states: 3|3 or 4|4. Of the 60 group formation rounds completed in the $1 welfare condition, 3|3 was the most common configuration, and it became somewhat more common over time. All possible partitions were still occurring in the final round, however. The next step was to track changes over time for each case, to determine transition probabilities for each set of states, including repeating the same state (no change). If the probabilities for each possible state transition are equal, then there are no point attractors. Table 2 gives the transition probabilities separately for the two conditions. For each observed configuration in Rounds 1 through 3, the percentages indicate the proportion of populations with that configuration in round t that transitioned to each of the four possible configurations the next round (t+ 1). Numbers on the diagonal represent configurations that repeat (no change across rounds). The 3|3 and 4|4 configurations both have considerable persistence in the Arrow, Crosson / SELF-ORGANIZED GROUP FORMATION 539 no-welfare condition, whereas 3|3 is the only configuration that persists in the $1 welfare condition.
As shown in Figure 1 , the percent of populations repeating configurations across rounds increased with time in the no-welfare condition. Between Rounds 1 and 2, about half of the populations in each condition changed configurations. By the third transition between Rounds 3 and 4, however, all but one of the no-welfare populations stabilized, compared to only 60% in the welfare condition. The association between condition and continuity was significant at the p < .05 level for this transition, χ 2 (1, N = 29) = 4.86. People in the standard condition settled into a consistent configuration to a greater degree than people in the welfare condition.
PHASE PORTRAITS FOR GLOBAL CONFIGURATION
Using information about the round-to-round transitions for each population, we constructed phase portraits for each condition (see Figure 2 ). A phase portrait shows the trajectories of a system across time as it moves from one point to another in state space. To emphasize the main dynamics, representative trajectories observed across several systems are shown (Abraham et al., 1990 transitions that occurred only once in the data set as unrepresentative. The two abstract dimensions that define state space in these portraits are amount of inclusion and equality of member distribution across groups. A circle around one of the four possible "points" in phase space indicates that some populations repeated the configuration. A thicker circle shows a stronger tendency to "stick" or stabilize at this point. Arrows indicate observed transitions between states, with heavier arrows representing more frequently observed transitions. The attraction of inclusiveness in the no-welfare condition (see Figure 2 , top) is evident in the direction of transitions, which either move toward a more inclusive configuration or switch between the two fully inclusive configurations (4|4 and 3|5). The strongest tendency is for societies to move toward the 4|4 configuration, but they stabilized at both the 4|4 and the 3|3 configurations. The 4|4 attractor has a broad basin-populations move there from every other possible state in the space. However, the only way to end up at 3|3 was to start there, so there is no basin of attraction. (A point with these properties is known technically as a rest point, Abraham et al., 1990, p. II-13.) In the welfare condition, the picture is quite different (see Figure 2, bottom) . The 4|4 attractor has disappeared. Populations in any state except for 3|3 are more likely to change states than to repeat. The circle around the 3|3 configuration is the same thickness as in the no-welfare condition, indicating about the same frequency of populations repeating this configuration. What has changed is that populations that do not start here are changing to 3|3 and then changing again as part of the general drifting about that seems to have replaced the 4|4 attractor of the standard condition. The space appears relatively "flat," with lots of movement among states. The 3|3 and 3|4 configurations have become unstable points where trajectories both arrive and depart.
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FAMILIARITY MATTERS, YET MEMBERSHIP CHANGE PERSISTS
Our next set of analyses investigated the extent to which the "settling" of participants into a stable, repeating configuration was reducible to membership continuity at the group level. Using the index of dyadic membership continuity for adjacent rounds, a repeated-measures ANOVA indicated no significant difference in 542 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2003 membership continuity across condition or across the three transitions between rounds. The overall mean was .55 for no welfare (SD = .21) and .51 for $1 welfare (SD = .14). This suggests that the tendency for the global configuration to stabilize with time in the no-welfare condition cannot be explained by less membership change. In both conditions, however, people together in one round were more likely to be together in the next round than would be expected by chance, consistent with the assumption that people prefer more familiar others. For repeating 3|3 configurations (n = 29), mean membership continuity was .494, significantly higher than the chance baseline level of .215 (z = +1.83, p < .05 level, one-tailed). For 4|4 configurations (n = 23), mean membership continuity was .674, also significantly higher than the .429 baseline (z = +1.92, p < .05, one-tailed). "Familiar" dyads that were together in a previous round have a clear tendency to reassemble in the next round.
They were not necessarily reassembling in the same groups, however. Exact repeats of the same fixed group membership across rounds, although more common than expected by chance, were still relatively rare. In all, 13 exact repeats of membership composition (23%) occurred for the 56 adjacent rounds in which the configuration was stable. Although this clearly exceeds chance levels (0 or 1 repeat), it also indicates that global configurations can and do stabilize without the composition of the constituent groups becoming fixed. Table 3 shows the observed and expected frequencies for different levels of continuity for the 3|3 and 4|4 patterns.
NEW GROUPS AND "CROWDED" GROUPS ARE LESS LIKELY TO PERSIST
When we drop from the full configuration to look at the group level, only 26% of groups in Rounds 2 through 4 had the same members as a group in a previous round. In the first round, all groups were new. Of these, 24% reassembled with the same exact members in Round 2. For the next two transitions, the probability of reassembling the same group depended on whether the group was new or had already "reconfirmed" its membership by reassembling in Round 2. Only 14% of new groups reassembled, whereas 66% of "established" groups reconvened with the same members. The association between newness and likelihood of changing versus staying with the same membership was significant at the p < .01 level for the transition to Round 3, χ 2 (1) = 12.46, and to Round 4, 544 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2003 χ 2 (1) = 17.55, n = 29 for each. Reassembling a group appears to strengthen the attraction of that group as a continuing structure.
We also looked at whether groups that were larger than the optimal size of three members were more likely to dissolve. Results indicated a significant association for groups in the welfare condition, χ 2 (1, 90) = 6.54, p < .05, but not for the no-welfare groups, χ 2 (1, 90) < 1, ns.
OVERCLAIMING MAY DESTABILIZE; STABLE MEMBERSHIP PROMOTES COOPERATION
Overclaiming was another endogenous event that could plausibly destabilize groups. We checked whether groups that overclaimed in Rounds 1, 2, or 3 were less likely to reassemble with the same membership composition in the next round compared to groups that did not. In each round, groups that overclaimed were Arrow, Crosson / SELF-ORGANIZED GROUP FORMATION 545 Repeating 4|4 (n = 23)
Observed Expected
Both identical 8* 0.7* Repeat triads 12 10.5 Repeat dyads 3* 11.8 NOTE: Numbers with asterisks depart substantially from that expected by chance. Random continuity was determined by conditioning on global configuration, enumerating all possible distributions of members given that configuration, and assessing dyadic continuity between all possible transitions (for more detail, see the Measures section).
somewhat less likely to reassemble, but chi-square tests indicated that this tendency, although consistent, was not statistically reliable. Next, we considered the reciprocal impact of membership continuity on overclaiming: Were repeating groups more cooperative than newly constituted groups? For this analysis, we looked at claims in Rounds 2 through 4 (all groups in Round 1 were new). Results indicated that new groups had a worse problem with overclaiming than groups that had been together before. The trend was the same in each round, and the difference was significant in Round 3, t(57) = 2.875, p < .01, and in Round 4, t(47) = 2.507, p < .02. The correction for unequal variance was used in both cases, and effect sizes were r 2 = .13 and .12. Means for the overclaiming measure were .575 (SD = 1.47) for new groups and -.20 (SD = .62) for repeating groups in Round 3; in Round 4 the figures were M = .486 (SD = 1.56) for new groups and M = -.24 (SD = .60) for repeating groups. The reader will recall that negative values indicate claims below group earnings. In percentage terms, 29% of new groups overclaimed, whereas only 5% of repeating groups did so. The lower incidence of overclaiming for new groups was significant in each round, χ 2 (1, N = 60) = 4.09, 4.21, and 5.88 for the three rounds, all p < .05.
MOST EXCLUSION WAS TEMPORARY, NOT CHRONIC
A final question about the overall flow of members among groups was whether exclusion was typically a fleeting or chronic state. A third of the people in the experiment (33%) were isolates at least once. Twenty-two of the 30 populations in the study had an isolate in at least one round; 17 of the populations (4 in the standard, 13 in the welfare condition) had isolates in more than one round. Ten included people who were isolates for more than one round, but no one was shut out for all four rounds. Nine people were isolates twice in four rounds; 10 were isolates three times. The sequencing of their exclusion suggests that although the most common experience of exclusion was a fleeting one, some people did settle into a stable isolate role. Six people (all but one in the welfare condition) were excluded from groups in each of the last three rounds. The 546 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2003 overall probability of becoming an isolate in a given round was 11%, but for a person left out in a previous round, the probability was 29%.
A CHECK FOR CONFOUNDS: GENDER AND ETHNICITY
Because the proportion of females and the ethnic breakdown differed somewhat in the two conditions, they are potential confounds in interpreting the impact of welfare on group formation. Gender, in particular, might affect the propensity of group members to empathize with the plight of isolates. Empirical research indicates the expected female edge in empathy is primarily found in self-report measures rather than actual helping behavior (see reviews by Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987) , but if gender role expectations are salient, women also outperform men on objective measures of empathy (Ickes, Gesn, & Graham, 2000; Klein & Hodges, 2001) . Because strongly skewed compositions make gender salient (Cohen & Swim, 1995; Kanter, 1977) , gender composition could influence people's willingness to help those in danger of being excluded.
To investigate whether the proportion of women in a given 8-person population was associated with the incidence of isolates, we included percent female as a covariate in an ANCOVA that treated welfare condition as the independent variable and average group size (across four rounds) as the dependent variable. No significant effect was detected (F < 1 for the covariate). The correlation between percent female and average group size was also not significant, Spearman's r = .108 (N = 29). It is worth noting that because women were more numerous in the welfare condition (which was less inclusive), any tendency toward greater altruism among women would influence groups in the opposite direction from the observed pattern. We did discover that men were proportionately more likely (43%) to have the experience of being an isolate than were women (29%), χ 2 (1, N = 239) = 4.56, p < .05. We ran parallel tests for ethnicity and found no association between ethnicity, average group size, or experience of being an isolate. Arrow, 
DISCUSSION
This study had two goals. The first was to investigate how compensating isolates affects membership dynamics at three levels. At the individual level, we found that the availability of a small welfare payment increased the incidence of isolates, including chronic outsiders (who nevertheless remain atypical in both conditions). This makes sense because the gradient of rewards between joining a group and remaining an isolate is flatter when welfare is available.
If we attend to this individual level only (a popular strategy in both psychology and public policy), the results suggest a story about flagging motivation and effort. Perhaps the 10 people who were excluded in 3 out of 4 rounds just were not trying hard enough, because they knew a safety net (the $1) was available. However, 4 of the 10 habitual isolates were actually in the standard condition. The "slacker" explanation is also not persuasive for the 69 other participants who were isolates at least once, or in a few cases twice, but not consistently. Why would their motivation wax and wane across rounds when the payoff structure remained constant?
If we move up to the group level, the patterning of isolates suggests a different story, one about the decreasing motivation of existing members to let unneeded "free-loaders" into their emergent groups. If the availability of welfare made it harder to talk one's way into groups that already had three members, then perhaps people were getting left out more or less at random as happens, for example, in the game of musical chairs. A small number of repeat isolates would be expected simply by chance. At the group level, then, this becomes a story about how the attraction of minimally sized groups increases when welfare is available to isolates. Or, viewed from the opposite side, how the felt obligation to include everyone wanes in importance. No interesting difference in membership dynamics was apparent at the level of the group: the incidence of membership change was virtually identical in the two conditions.
The most striking differences in dynamics were at the "society" level, the shifting array of groups and isolates into which the population organized itself. When welfare was not available, the popula-548 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2003 tion stabilized across rounds into a consistent pattern of including everyone in groups. Equally sized groups of four were particularly attractive, and once the eight people organized themselves into this configuration, they tended to repeat it, even if membership at the group level continued to shift across rounds. The story here is a classic example of self-organization-the emergence of structure from an initially unorganized set of interacting components. The structure would not, however, be apparent if we looked only at the group level. Instead, analysis at multiple levels reveals that a coherent configuration of groups and individuals is emerging and stabilizing without a corresponding "freezing" of members in specific groups.
What impact does welfare have on this dynamic? It seems to prevent the population from settling into a predictable pattern. Instead, the global configuration continues to shift across multiple rounds and no attractors are evident. When welfare is not available, forces that stabilize behavior appear to dominate. When the $1 welfare payment is available, either these stabilizing forces are weaker or they are cancelled out by countervailing "destabilizing" forces.
The second objective of the study was to test for the impact of several factors that we expected to affect the gradient of attraction for potential group members attempting to form and join groups. The factors we focused on, like the groups themselves, were "emergent": created and shaped by the behavior of the people being studied.
Familiarity among members and groups emerged and accumulated as people sought one another out, in some cases repeatedly. In both conditions, the choice of partners became more predictable after the first round, with people seeking out previous group mates at a higher than chance level. This is consistent with the "chaining" theory of group formation, in which dyads serve as the building blocks for groups (Moreland, 1987 , reviews other evidence for chaining).
The pull of familiarity at the group level was more complicated. If we look only at the transition between the first and second rounds, it appears that group familiarity is not a big factor: only a quarter of the groups reassembled with the same membership. The percentage of new groups in round two that reassemble in subsequent rounds is even smaller. Yet fully two thirds of groups that reconfirmed their membership by reassembling in round two persisted with the same membership in subsequent rounds. This suggests a "sensitive" early period during which a group can establish a fixed roster of members. If people shift among groups in this early period, however, they are increasingly unlikely to settle in subsequent rounds. The pattern of settling into fixed membership groups versus keeping membership fluid becomes, in essence, an emergent population level norm based on whatever happens in the first transition.
We also expected, in accordance with club theory, that overcrowding would destabilize groups, and results supported thisbut only in the welfare condition. When welfare was available, membership change was more likely in groups that were larger than the optimum size. In the standard condition, overcrowding did not affect the tendency of groups to reassemble, and the costs of overcrowding clearly did not deter people from forming larger groups in the first place.
The final "emergent" factor that we expected to destabilize groups was overclaiming. Although results were consistent with this expectation, the trend was not statistically significant. The more interesting finding reversed the causal arrow. When group membership stabilized, it effectively eliminated overclaiming. This suggests that fixed membership groups are better able to fix problems caused by member misbehavior than groups in which membership is less consistent. In fact, a substantial proportion of the fixed membership groups underclaimed, a phenomenon that seems at odds with the economic motive of maximizing earnings.
Why did groups do this? To keep the division of money equal among members, it seems. In 3-or 4-person groups, the $10 the group earned could not be divided equally because of the restriction that claims be in whole dollar amounts. Consistent with an equity explanation, members of underclaiming 3-person groups each claimed $3, leaving $1 unclaimed; members of underclaiming 4-person groups each claimed $2, leaving $2 unclaimed. The power of the equity norm apparently outweighed the pull of economic self-interest in these groups. Research on the behavior of hourly workers (Goodman & Friedman, 1971) has found that people respond to inequitable underpayment by decreasing their output, but also respond to inequitable overpayment by improving the quality of what they produce (in line with equity theory, but inconsistent with a self-interested maximization strategy). In such settings, workers can control their output but not their wages. In our experiment, intragroup fairness could be ensured by leaving $1 or $2 unclaimed.
We believe the relative pull of economic self-interest and equity can also explain the different membership dynamics in the two conditions. Intragroup equity dictates that each member earn the same amount. If players consider the full population, however, it is also clear that leaving people out is "unfair" because isolates earn nothing. People also know from their own life experiences that it feels bad to be excluded, even if there is no money at stake.
This line of reasoning suggests that when isolates receive nothing, the "pull" of self-interest is outweighed by the "push" of equity and the attendant obligation to include others. The gradient is tilted and people gravitate toward the most equitable solution: even-sized groups that divide the money as equally as possible. There were exceptions, however: some populations settled on a pattern of two 3-person groups instead.
When people are uncertain about how to behave, the behavior of others serves as a source of information about relevant social norms. In such circumstances, action can be governed by what Cialdini (1993) called the principle of "social proof": when in doubt, copy the behavior of others. This could help explain why the 3|3 configuration was relatively sticky, even though it was not a true attractor. When people who formed a minimally sized group saw that others had done the same, this provided evidence that acting in line with economic self-interest was acceptable. In the standard condition, all populations had settled on either the 4|4 attractor or the 3|3 rest point by Round 4. In line with social proof, the only populations that stabilized on the 3|3 configuration were ones that had Arrow, divided in this way in Round 1. Otherwise, it was a transient state. In this way, an emergent global pattern can in turn stabilize behavior at the local level.
When a small compensation for isolates is available, it is easier for people to justify excluding others (after all, they will earn something) and so the two conflicting forces are more balanced, creating a flat gradient. Conflicting pressures operate at the group level when members have different preferences (some want to let an extra person in and others do not) and at the individual level when a person holds incompatible preferences. This may be because one wants incompatible things (have cake and eat it too) or because of conflict between what one wants and what social norms prescribe (want someone else's cake). Momentary influences can easily shift a conflicted person from preferring one course of action to another, which in turn can shift the balance of opinions within a group, creating instability.
An overall finding of the study is thus that the pattern of group formation may be consistent over time because of the impact of prevailing contextual conditions; it may also be inconsistent over time, again because of the impact of context. The availability of welfare is clearly one feature of context that affects the pattern.
LIMITATIONS, BOUNDARY CONDITIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As suggested by the logic outlined above, one limitation of the study is that we had only two conditions: no welfare and $1 welfare. We speculate that compensation for isolates moved the system from a more stable to a less stable state by balancing out conflicting pressures. To be confident that we have indeed identified the relevant parameter, we would need to replicate the experiment, add conditions that adjust the parameter further, and measure people's relative endorsement of self-interest versus equity and concern for others. The results of the current study should not be taken as evidence that compensating isolates necessarily destabilizes a system. If we provided a higher payment to isolates, for example, we expect 552 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / October 2003 that the dynamics would "settle down" again, with minimally sized groups as a broad, stable attractor.
Just as our results might be different with an increased payment to isolates, they might be different if more or less money overall was at stake in the experiment. Certainly in naturally occurring clubs, the value of benefits for members and the impact of overcrowding on those benefits varies widely. However, it is clear that even relatively small amounts of money affect behavior. The only experimentally imposed difference between the two conditions was whether isolates earn $0 or $1. Observed differences in inclusiveness indicate that participants were sensitive to this difference. During the experiment, group members often engaged in extended discussions about who was entitled to $3 versus $4, which also suggests that they found the difference important enough to argue about. Finally, many participants did claim more than their share of group earnings, presumably to try and make a few more dollars at the expense of others.
The study is limited by the small number of data points. Extending the number of rounds would give us more points in the trajectory of each system. It is quite possible, for example, that populations in the welfare condition would have settled down eventually and that four rounds were not enough to capture some essential features of the dynamics.
A further limitation was that all participants were peers, and the distribution of cards gave them resources of potentially equivalent value in forming groups and generating group benefits. However, at least when no welfare is available, inequality does not appear to affect inclusion rates. In a separate social poker experiment in which inequalities were introduced by giving participants cards that were more or less useful, groups still included the "lower status" members and did so increasingly during multiple rounds (Arrow & Burns, 2003) .
Another possible next step is to investigate the stability of attractors when the contextual parameter is changed (rather than fixed at different levels). What might the picture look like if the population forms groups repeatedly with no welfare, and welfare is then intro-duced? A key insight of dynamical systems studies is path dependence. A system that begins with welfare is not the same as a system that has welfare introduced. And eliminating welfare is different than never having had such a system.
Despite these speculations about possible parallels in society as a whole, we believe that our findings do depend in part on the small size of our miniature "societies." The readiness of groups to take in extra people might well disappear if the game were played with a larger pool of strangers. In a larger crowd, it would be easier to ignore isolates, even though the burden of including them might be shared among more groups. This prediction is in line with findings about the effect of number of bystanders on helping behavior (e.g., Darley & Latané, 1968) .
Letting groups grow larger than is strictly necessary can have both bad and good effects. Overstaffing can contribute to social ills such as social loafing at the group level and economic inefficiency in business. Yet overstaffing also makes a group more robust to turnover and temporary absences and prevents members from exerting undue influence by threatening to leave. The best strategy may be to discover and promote conditions that encourage the movement of members among groups and the formation of new groups so that those who are temporarily left out can find or create alternate groups. At the macro level, such fluidity can help transfer knowledge and other resources between groups. It can also encourage dissatisfied members to find or create a group that better suits their needs and talents, in line with Buchanan's (1965) original vision of an ecology of diverse clubs catering to the diverse tastes of prospective members.
